| AIM AND OUTLINE
The general aim of this paper is to provide clarity on this topic by addressing the current relationships between some of the most influential paradigms, and describing how these have changed over time.
Its specific aim is to interrogate the continuing viability of positivism as a guiding paradigm for nursing research.
Competing paradigms will be examined to show how their critical insights have fundamentally challenged core aspects of positivism. Four major paradigmatic challenges to positivism are examined.
While these paradigms have complex histories involving numerous thinkers, for heuristic purposes we have identified the origin of each of them with the ideas of a single seminal theorist: the Kantian, which led to the development of interpretive and constructivist approaches; the Marxian, which led to the development of transformative approaches; the Durkheimian, which led to realist approaches; and the Popperian, which led to postpositivist approaches. We will argue that acceptance of any of the first three of these approaches necessarily entails wholesale rejection of positivism, while acceptance of postpositivism involves its partial rejection.
In order to show how positivism, even on the methodological terrain where it was once reigned supreme, has been rendered redundant, we will explore how it relates to that paragon of contemporary scientific method-the randomized controlled trial.
| THE SOURCE OF PAR AD I G M CONFUS ION
Much of the paradigm confusion in nursing appears to stem from the sometimes misleading information emanating from one source of authority-research methods textbooks. We explored this issue by undertaking a content analysis of a number of nursing research books published between 2010 and 2015. Coding of descriptors demonstrated that the characterization of positivism was inconsistent, and in some cases anachronistic.
Thus, for example, while some textbooks clearly explain the differences between positivism and postpositivism and position contemporary quantitative research within the postpositivist paradigm (Grove, Burns, & Gray, 2013) , others do not differentiate between the approaches (Grove, Gray, & Burns, 2015) . Indeed, the term "postpositivism" itself is riven with ambiguity, with no agreed definition of it among commentators. For some, it is a broad term including both interpretivist and objectivist positions (O'Leary, 2004) . For others, it is confined to a description of Karl Popper's revision and reformulation of positivism (Creswell, 2003) . Because of its greater definitional specificity, it is the latter sense that we will use in this paper.
In other instances, authors classify all quantitative research as having its roots in positivism and qualitative research as having its roots in interpretivism or constructivism without reference to alternative paradigms or to the broad range of research that comes under their influence (McKie, 2014; Topping, 2015) . Some textbooks refer to positivism as the paradigmatic origin of quantitative research, but do not qualify its current position (Burns & Grove, 2011) . Others do make such a qualification, arguing that while quantitative social research developed within the positivist paradigm, today it is no longer guided by positivism (Grove et al., 2013; Parahoo, 2014) . Still others suggest that quantitative research is a "…modified positivist position…" (Polit & Beck, 2012, p. 12), which is dominant in nursing research and, for reasons of simplicity, categorize it as positivism. Furthermore, there are a number of authors that label quantitative and qualitative approaches as "paradigms" rather than methodical strategies (LoBiondo-Wood & Haber, 2014; Tappen, 2011) .
The lack of consistency in terminology and categorization of approaches in research textbooks is particularly confusing for novice researchers, who are often challenged to justify the philosophical underpinnings of their studies. In order to meet this challenge, they need to be clear on the differences and similarities between the competing paradigms, and be confident in defending the philosophical foundation of their work.
Untangling the elements of this challenge requires an appreciation of the historical development of the philosophy of science, including how various philosophical strands relate to each other historically and ideationally.
| THE EMERG EN CE OF THE " SCIENTIFIC ME THOD"
MAN, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything (Bacon, 1857: Aphorism I).
Before addressing positivism, it is important to set out the context of its emergence. According to Karl Popper (1989) , it can be seen as an important stage in human intellectual evolution.
For Popper, the first great evolutionary break of humans from other animals was the development of language, which enabled humans to describe and seek to explain the world around them. In early societies, these explanations were animistic and superstitious, developing in time into more sophisticated myths and religions with their own hermetically sealed schools of thought. A crucial characteristic of these schools, for reasons of societal cohesion (Durkheim, 1995) , was that their tenets were regarded as inviolate: "A school of this kind never admits a new idea. New ideas are heresies" (Popper, 1989: 141) .
According to Popper, the next momentous stage in human intellectual evolution was the emergence of criticism, whereby it was permissible to question established ideas about the nature of the world.
Criticism found its first expression in the pre-Socratic philosophers of classical Greece, but submerged again in Europe with the rise of Platonic idealism and then dogmatic Christianity. 1 Later, with the Renaissance (the name of which refers to the rebirth of classical ideas),
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Like many sweeping historical schemas, Popper's can be accused of over-simplification.
For example, there is evidence that medieval thought was considerably more disputatious that Popper indicates (Marenbon, 2007) .
followed by the Enlightenment and the rise of science, criticism began to be accepted again as a powerful tool for advancing knowledge.
It was in this context that the 17th-century English philosopher, Francis Bacon, promulgated what is known as the scientific method.
For Bacon, our understanding of the world should not be based on metaphysical systems but on observation. However, he accepted scholastic philosophy's concerns about the unreliability of human interpretation of sensory inputs. He argued therefore that our stance towards any claims to empirical knowledge should be one of doubt
and that they should be tested systematically and repeatedly. He identified the experimental method as the best way of doing this.
This involved the repeated application of a putative causal state or event to ascertain whether a putative effect was consistently detected following its application.
| P OS ITIVIS M
All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon's time, that there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts (Comte, 1896: 29) .
The practical successes of natural science were the inspiration for the development of positivism as a model for understanding society. The French philosopher and sociologist, Auguste Comte, saw science as the means for understanding society and human behaviour. He coined the term "positive" philosophy to differentiate it from the negative philosophy, which he believed underpinned woolly and metaphysical thinking (Comte, 1875 ). Comte's positivist approach involved the use of scientific methods to uncover the dynamics of society in the same manner that physical science was uncovering the dynamics of the natural world (the philosophical term for this common purpose is "naturalism," a term which has somewhat confusingly also been adopted by recent qualitative researchers to describe the study of people in their "natural" environments. It is used in the former sense in this paper).
Comte believed that scientists should focus on confirmable observations of empirical events and this alone should constitute human knowledge. His analogy between the natural and social worlds was not limited to his epistemology. At the ontological level, he assumed that people's actions were subject to social laws in the same way that events in the natural world were governed by natural laws.
The word positivism originates from the Latin word "positum"
and means that facts are "posited" or positioned in front of the researcher (Alvesson, 2009 ). For positivists, objective truth existed and the goal of science was to discover it. To uncover truth, the researcher was required to be objective and collect facts using methods that were value-free (McEvoy & Richards, 2006) . By such methods, it was claimed they could identify general laws (McEvoy & Richards, 2006; Parahoo, 2014; Weaver & Olson, 2006) .
As to what those laws were, positivists took an empiricist approach (empiricism being the doctrine that all knowledge is based on experience). They regarded laws as empirically observable relations of cause and effect. This reflected the position taken by the Scottish eighteenth-century philosopher, David Hume (1969) .
He argued that causal laws are based on the empirical experience of "constant conjunctions," whereby one event is observed to occur immediately and consistently after another. Thus, causality rests in the relation of constant conjunction, rather than in any force external to that relation. In essence, the positivist doctrine involved the following logic:
Our minds interpret the world through our senses, and because the world is subject to the laws of science, events outside the mind can be observed, described, explained and predicted. Therefore, to make sense of the outside world all we had to do was to observe it (McKenna, 1997, p 121) .
By placing rational observation as the key to understanding the social world, positivism marked an important step in humanity's intellectual development. However, it should be noted that Comte (1875) regarded it as a new (albeit secular) religion, in that he saw it as capable of uncovering inviolable truths gathered together under the umbrella of a unified science. Later positivists, most notably those of the Vienna
Circle of logical positivists, while vociferously decrying any form of metaphysics, remained true to the Comtean aspiration to the unity of science.
| Logical positivism
The aim of the logical positivists was to defend and strengthen positivist empiricism in the context of early twentieth-century scientific developments. They attempted to shore up empiricism in an era
where an ever increasing proportion of science's subject matter was not directly observable; a development most dramatically displayed by the replacement of classical physics by quantum mechanics. They argued that the theoretical axioms required to explain these phenomena, while they could not be verified directly, could be anchored empirically by "correspondence rules" (Carnap, 1966) which were amenable to observational testing.
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Logical positivists also attempted to strengthen positivism by marshalling the ideas of the early Wittgenstein (1974) to argue that empirical knowledge was the only valid form of knowing. On the basis of "the principle of verifiability," which states that the meaning of a proposition lies in its method of verification (Passmore, 1967) , they contended that any statement that could not be empirically verified was not just mistaken or confused, but was meaningless nonsense (Ayer, 1936) .
2 While logical positivism had disintegrated as a distinctive philosophical position by the 1940s (Passmore, 1967) , its echoes continued in Anglo-American thought, not least through influence of the diaspora of those associated with it. Thus, the emphasis that logical empiricists such Hempel (1965) placed on the importance of theoretical axioms as the foundation of scientific disciplines provided considerable impetus for the development of nursing theories and conceptual frameworks in the 1970s and 1980s (Risjord, 2010 ).
| CHALLENG E S TO P OS ITIVIS M
Positivism has faced a number of significant challenges, four of which we will adumbrate here. Our discussion is ordered according to the chronology in which the challenges emerged. Indeed, Immanuel Kant planted the seeds of the first challenge before Comte was even born.
These challenges at least partially map on to the four-part typology of paradigms proposed by MacKenzie and Knipe (2006) 
| The Kantian challenge
It is not that by our sensibility we cannot know the nature of things in themselves in any save a confused fashion;
we do not apprehend them in any fashion whatsoever (Kant, 2007: B62) .
The first set of interrelated challenges have their wellspring in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (2007) , who distinguished between things in themselves (noumena) and what appears to our senses (phenomena). He argued that all we can ever have access to are phenomena, rendering the objective world unknowable.
Kantian ideas influenced the work of Max Weber (1949) , who used their emphasis of the importance of the subjective to refute the ability of natural scientific methods to explain human behaviour.
He argued that understanding social behaviour required interpretation of the meanings and motives of the actors involved, whose actions were the result of choice rather than determined by social laws. Thus, the naturalist approach of positivism was challenged by the rise of interpretivist sociology.
An even more direct line from Kant can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Thus, in relation to scientific method, Edmund Husserl (1970) argued that the use of positivistic science to uncover human thinking in disciplines such as psychology distorted human experience. Once again, the message was that positivism was an inappropriate way to find out about people because it treated thinking and feeling human beings as objects.
Another neo-Kantian attack on positivism came via the nineteenth-century German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, and in particular his admonition to seekers after knowledge:
Let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason", … "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable … in which the active and interpreting forces … are supposed to be lacking … There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing" (Nietzsche, 1969, 119 , emphasis in original).
Nietzsche's perspectivism had a major influence on postmodernists' rejection of grandiose explanatory "metanarratives" (Lyotard, 1984) . The postmodernist acceptance of perspectivism led to their abandonment of any pretentions to generalize knowledge, and to their denial of the scientist's ability to adopt an objective stance.
| The Marxian challenge
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it (Marx, 1974: 123) .
In contrast to the positivist conception of the role of the social scientist as simply describing the causal laws that govern human behaviour, Marx argued that structured social relations could be altered through political action (Marx & Engels, 2002 argue that in order to explain social reality, it is essential to evaluate and criticize its own self-understanding (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002 ).
Marx concentrated on class inequalities between those who owned and controlled the means of production and those who did not. However, critical or transformative social science has since broadened its scope to encompass other forms of inequality, such as those associated with ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation.
| The Durkheimian challenge
A social fact is … capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint … [It] is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right, independent of its individual manifestations (Durkheim, 1966: 13) .
The nineteenth-century French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, challenged positivism's empiricist ontology. As can be seen from the quotation above, Durkheim (1966) expanded the definition of what counted as real from "individual manifestations" (i.e., the empirically observable events that positivists viewed as constituting reality) to include those forces that exercised "external constraint" on events.
In doing so, he was setting out the scientific realist alternative to positivism.
Scientific realists argue that positivists misunderstand the nature of causation. This misunderstanding comes from their acceptance of David Hume's (1969) empiricism, which reduces causal laws to being one and the same as constant conjunctions. In contrast, realism asserts the independent reality of causal forces, which they see as ontologically distinct from the events they generate. Moving causation from constantly conjoined events to generative mechanisms has significant consequences for science. Rather than being restricted to describing constant conjunctions, science can start to explain how the influence of causal mechanisms is exerted.
Since Durkheim, scientific realism has developed along a number of lines. However, its most sustained development as a philosophy of science is critical realism, which combines the ontological realism of Durkheim with the critical social science of the Marxist tradition (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1998) .
In his examination of the nature of causation, the twentieth-cen- For critical realists, the opportunities, restraints and social mores embedded in structured social relations have a powerful influence on how people behave (Archer, 1995) . Their assertion of the power of social mechanisms to influence the patterning of events, including human actions, involves a rejection of the neo-Kantian position that explanation of human behaviour should be sought solely in the meanings and motivations of the actors involved (Husserl, 2012; Weber, 1949) .
However, critical realists also reject the Comtean model of causation, which places exclusive causal onus on social laws and regards human agency as epiphenomenal. Instead, they insist that, because both social structures and human agents possess their own unique generative mechanisms, one cannot be reduced to the other (Archer, 1995) . They assert the need to "distinguish sharply … between the genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons, intentions and plans of human beings, on the one hand; and the structures governing the reproduction and transformation of social activities, on the other" (Bhaskar, 1989: 79) . This in turn leads to an assumption of the appropriateness of mixed-methods approaches. Patterns of events and behaviours can only be demonstrated through numerical calculation. However, because "meanings cannot be measured, only understood" (Bhaskar, 1998:46) , qualitative approaches are needed to uncover people's understandings and motivations.
| Summary of points of divergence between positivism and alternative paradigms
The primary points of divergence between positivism and the three perspectives outlined above are as follows:
• Interpretivists' insistence on the importance of taking into account individuals' capacity to think and to choose to act in certain ways undermines the determinist philosophy of positivism, which sees people's actions as governed by natural and social laws.
• A stronger constructivist argument refutes positivism's claim to be able to uncover objective knowledge about a unified reality, adopting a relativism that regards both reality and our understandings of it as constantly shifting from one perspective to another.
• Those from the transformative paradigm argue that acceptance that humans can shape their social world is at variance with positivism's value neutrality and social determinism, which prevents it from contributing to critical analysis of social formations that in turn can be used to inform human choices about improving the social world.
• Realists argue that positivism's empiricist concentration on establishing laws through the observation of constant conjunctions of events leaves it unable to adequately explain causation in terms of tendencies, which is how it is almost invariably manifested in open systems.
• A common criticism of positivism from all these perspectives involves their rejection of its belief in science's ability to uncover definitive objective facts.
| The Popperian challenge
"Observation is always selective … It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem" (Popper, 1989: 46) . Popper was scathing in his criticism of these attempts, accusing them of sharing "with all the older attempts an unfounded assumption … that all genuine statements must be, in principle, completely decidable" (Popper, 1972: 312) . He went on to argue that "If this assumption is dropped, then it becomes possible to solve in a simple way the problem of induction. We can, quite consistently, interpret natural laws or theories as genuine statements which are partially decidable, i.e., which are, for logical reasons, not verifiable but, in an asymmetrical way, falsifiable only" (312-13, emphasis in original).
In other words, while it is not possible to state definitively that a statement is true, it is possible to state definitively that it is false.
In how frequently experimental science fails to falsify a hypothesis, the possibility that it will be falsified in the future still remains. This inability of science to vouchsafe the causal relations it identifies leads postpositivism to accept that scientific knowledge is always provisional and subject to potential falsification. While science may get us closer to the truth by ruling out false conjectures, it can never definitively assert that it has attained it-scientific statements are only ever "partially decidable."
Popper's rejection of positivism's inductive approach involved a rejection of epistemological empiricism. For positivists, knowledge could be gained from simply looking at the facts, while for
Popper, this was an untenable position: "the belief that we can start with pure observations alone, without anything in the nature of theory, is absurd" (Popper, 1989: 46) . Thus, postpositivism asserts the primacy of theory, arguing that science progresses from the identification of clearly articulated hypotheses that are posed in such a manner that that they are amenable to empirical falsification.
The centrality postpositivism gives to theory has important con- This is in contrast to the transformative paradigm which warrants the development of assumptions about how the world should be (Popper, 1957) .
| Similarities and differences between positivism and postpositivism

| Similarities
Positivism and postpositivism share the following assumptions:
• The scientific method can be used to understand relations of cause and effect in both the social and natural worlds.
• Systematic and sustained empirical observation is key to gaining knowledge.
• The focus of science should be on the conjunctions of events because it is the constancy of conjunction that constitutes causation.
• Science should be value neutral.
| P OS ITIVIS M , P OS TP OS ITIVIS M AND THE R ANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL
In order to demonstrate that, even in the area where the claim of positivism's salience is most persistent, key components of positivism have been rendered redundant, we will now examine the methodological underpinnings of the current "gold standard" of the scientific method in healthcare research-the randomized controlled trial (RCT). We will support our arguments through the use of examples of recent nursing RCTs.
In the literature, confusion often surrounds the question of procedures, they are designed to ensure that the predispositions of the scientists and subjects involved will not bias the results of the trial (Altman, 1991; Jadad, 1998) .
In terms of the differences, RCTs do not simply gather data with a view to identifying effective therapies, but commence with hypotheses that are then empirically tested (Jadad, 1998) . where inferential statistics are used to test null hypotheses, which predict that no causal relationship exists (Machin, Campbell, & Walters, 2007) . Thus, the testing of null hypotheses in RCTs, notably through the use of p (probability) values that seek to measure the probability of observed outcomes being the result of chance, adheres to the postpositivist dictum that scientific research should aim for falsification rather than verification. Numerous examples of the use of p values in nurse-led RCTs can be given (see, e.g., Dumville et al., 2009; Mooney et al., 2014) .
The greater evidential weight given to systematic and meta-analytic reviews of multiple RCTs than to individual RCTs indicates an acceptance that, notwithstanding their rigour, the results obtained from RCTs should not be regarded as definitive (Gough, Oliver, & Thomas, 2012) . Thus, for example, an RCT evaluating an educational programme to reduce the use of external restraints by staff on patients with dementia came to the conclusion that "staff education can … reduce the use of physical restraints." (Pelifolk, Gustafson, Bucht, and Karlsson (2010, p. 62) . However, a Cochrane systematic review which included five cluster-randomized controlled trials which met Cochrane quality criteria (including that of Pelifolk et al.) came to the conclusion that "There is insufficient evidence supporting the effectiveness of educational interventions targeting nursing staff for preventing or reducing the use of physical restraints in geriatric long-term care" (Möhler, Richter, Köpke, & Meyer, 2011, p. 2) .
Because the selection of hypotheses to be tested by RCTs is discretionary, scientists have a creative role to play in the direction in which science develops. One way they do this is by identifying problems that they regard as worthy of investigation. Thus, Hanson,
| Differences
Positivism and postpositivism differ in relation to the following assumptions:
Positivism Postpositivism
Causal laws are identified by means of systematic and sustained empirical observation of instances of conjunction (inductivism).
Hypotheses conjecturing a causal relationship are tested by systematic and sustained empirical observation of instances of conjunction (hypothetico-deductivism).
The existence of causal laws can be confirmed if observation reveals the constant conjunction of the events being investigated (verification).
The aim of observation is to refute hypotheses about causal relationships (falsification).
Science is capable of uncovering the true nature of causal laws. While science can rule out false conjectures, it can never definitively establish the true nature of causal laws.
The role of the scientist is to systematically observe and record instances of constant conjunction and to develop or verify statements about laws on the basis of those observations. The scientist's role includes the development of conjectures and hypotheses, which means that they have a creative part to play in the research process.
Reynolds, Henderson, and Pickard (2005, p. 577) provide a rationale for their evaluation of a quality improvement intervention targeted at palliative care in nursing homes with the following statement:
"Death is a frequent occurrence in nursing homes, yet few clinical quality standards promote excellence in palliative care for those who die in this setting."
It can be seen from the above review that postpositivist tenets, rather than those of positivism, animate contemporary randomized controlled trials in the field of nursing.
| CONTEMP OR ARY NUR S ING RE S E ARCH PAR ADIG MS
The strong influence of postpositivism in the areas of experimental and quasi-experimental health research should not be taken to indicate that we have reached the end of methodological history.
Even within the paradigm, it is recognized that postpositivist strategies contain problematic tensions with which researchers and methodologists continue to struggle. These include the artificiality of RCTs' controlled settings, which compromises their ability to predict the effects of interventions in everyday clinical settings, and their focus on average effects, which blinds them to human individuality (Ernest, Jandrain, & Scheen, 2015; Rothwell, 2005) . More widely, it can be noted that the current state of play in nursing research methodology is one of pluralism. Acceptance of the importance to successful nursing care of patients', relatives' and clinicians' experiences and motivations has provided a solid foundation for those paradigms that assert the need for interpretation (Streubert & Carpenter, 2011) . Conversely, the rise of evidence-based nursing, with its assertion of the need for robust evidence about the effectiveness of nursing interventions, has encouraged the adoption of evaluation strategies that sit within the ambit of postpositivism (Porter & O'Halloran, 2009) .
While the increasing acceptance of pluralism has led to a cooling off of paradigmatic wars, this does not mean that conflict has ceased altogether. While there is mostly a patrician silence from the confident ranks of postpositivist methodologists, adherents to alternative argue that experimental designs' reliance on the notion of constant conjunction means that they cannot provide an adequate understanding of how and why things work. Others (Bonell, Fletcher, Morton, Lorenc, & Moore, 2012; Porter, McConnell, & Reid, 2017) argue that the RCT, with its capacity to identify the efficacy of an intervention within the confines of a closed system, is a necessary but not sufficient methodology, and needs to be combined with realist-based interrogations of individual experience and social context.
The most acute controversy between critical realism and postpositivism is grounded in the former's acceptance of transformative assumptions, which lead critical realists to challenge the postpositivist dichotomy between rationally based reasoning and value-based reasoning. They have pointed out that as beings whose relation to the world is one of concern (Sayer, 2011) , humans constantly use empirical knowledge to inform their concerns about present or future flourishing or suffering. While those who espouse value neutrality may be formally correct in their assertion that "ought" cannot be logically derived from "is," from a realist perspective, "[t]he force of the "ought"...is not a matter of the logical relations between statements, but of bodily needs or compulsions -states of being or becoming, not statements" (Sayer, 2011, p. 51 ).
Thus, a factual statement that describes an objective human need or lack contains within itself the inference that there is merit in responding to alleviate that need or lack. This argument has particular resonance for nurse researchers, given their shared acceptance that the avoidance of avoidable suffering of patients is a paramount value position (Porter, 2016) .
Ironically, the paradigm identified by MacKenzie and Knipe (2006) that has not been considered in depth here-the pragmatic paradigm-has, with the rise in popularity of mixed-methods approaches (Curry & Nunez-Smith, 2014 ) that are intimately associated with it, been one of the success stories of the last decade. The reason why we have not concentrated on pragmatic approaches is that their paradigmatic characteristics are very unclear. To the extent that pragmatic simply refers to the belief that research methods should be considered according to their practical consequences (Peirce, 1958) , it is hard to see them as constituting a distinct paradigm. To the extent that the pragmatic paradigm flags an adherence to the antifoundationalism of Richard Rorty's pragmatism (1991), then it can be categorized as another variant of Nietzschean perspectivism. Ambiguity is not lessened by consideration of the paradigmatic location of mixed-methods approaches. While often associated with pragmatism, they can be equally applicable in other paradigms including the transformative (Mertens, 2005) , realist (Allmark & Machaczek, 2018) and postpositivist (Medical Research Council, 2008) . Nevertheless, we would be remiss not to acknowledge that, with the cooling off of the paradigmatic wars, pragmatism's influence continues to grow.
It will be noted that positivism has not been mentioned in this summing up of contemporary healthcare methodology. While some of its tenets continue to animate the postpositivist paradigm (and continue to be the focus of critics of postpositivism), as a coherent overarching paradigm, it is now of little more than historical interest.
| CON CLUS I ON: THE REDUNDAN C Y OF P OS ITIVIS M
The previously hegemonic position of positivism has long gone.
Many social and healthcare researchers have abandoned it in favour of paradigms that they believe better incorporate the experiences, needs and aspirations of human subjects. However, while the interpretive, transformative and realist paradigms challenged the dominance of the positivist paradigm, they did not render it redundant. As long as positivism could claim to provide the paradigmatic structure for the scientific method, it could still assert its relevance. What finally rendered positivism redundant was the emergence of postpositivism, which supplanted it on the methodological territory that it had claimed as its own.
While debate continues about where best to locate healthcare research, that debate has moved on from consideration of the appropriateness of positivism as a foundational philosophy.
The twin pincers of antipositivist and postpositivist paradigms have divested it of its raison d'être. It is therefore anachronistic for nursing methodologists and research methods textbook writers to continue to refer to positivism as a pertinent research paradigm for contemporary nursing, just as it is inappropriate for nurse researchers to be expected to defend their work from a positivist stance.
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